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countries are compelled to spend millions of dollars
each day to pay off debt with money that could be
used for economic reform, education, healthcare,
or a multitude of other beneficial areas. In fact,
government spending on education and improving
the health of its citizens has declined due to an increase
in debt. This downward spiral has led to higher death
rates, particularly among children. An estimated
21,000 children die each day from poverty-related
causes, according to UNICEF’s Progress of Nations
2000 report.100 This figure implies the statistic of one
child’s death every four seconds, which amounts to
fourteen children each minute.101 In addition to poor
healthcare, low-income countries have suffered from
weak economic performance, which has resulted in a
decrease in economic reforms.
Despite these seemingly high statistics, there are
numerous organizations whose sole focus is to end, or
lessen, third world debt. These groups include Jubilee
2000 UK / Jubilee Debt Campaign (JDC), ChristianAid, Oxfam UK, World Development Movement,
Catholic Agency for Overseas Development
(CAFOD), and Tearfund. Of these organizations,
JDC is the most significant in that it is highly involved
in aiding third world countries. Their mission is to
bring “an end to all unpayable poor country debts by
fair and transparent means.”102 JDC hopes to amend
government policy on debt in order to cancel all third
world debt. They argue that the accumulation of
debt by third world countries was unjust and is only
making their economies worse.
Third world debt plays a critical role in how
countries govern themselves. Countries that are unable
to maintain a stable government and economy, such
as Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen, are often dominated
by stronger ones; therefore, the welfare of third world
economies is at risk of being controlled by terrorists
groups. In a speech to the Council on Foreign
Relations, Princeton N. Lyman explained that in east
Africa, “some [immediate threats] arise from failed or
100 Shah, Anup. “Debt and the Effect on Children,” Global Issues. 04 July
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failing states that allow financial exploitation by
terrorist groups or exploitation of internal conflicts
to recruit members to terrorist networks.”103 Terrorist
groups such as al-Qaeda and al-Shabab have already
demonstrated this by infiltrating numerous regions
throughout Africa and seizing control of various aspects
of society as a result of weak governmental security.
In order for third world countries to become more
robust against infiltrations by terrorists groups, as well as
reduce or even put an end to the debt crisis, governments
and bank sectors should put a greater emphasis on
analyzing their current financial situations. While
numerous online resources such as PovcalNet, have
been created to allow the public the ability to assess the
current poverty calculations, this should not be viewed
as the sole solution for such a wide-scale problem.104
The Jubilee Debt Campaign suggests that a complete
cancellation of all debt would be the ideal solution;
however, this is unrealistic. Instead, debt should be
analyzed as to what is payable versus unpayable, while
having grants issued as opposed to additional loans,
which frequently result in an exponential growth of
debt. If such changes are implemented in resolving the
debt crisis, third world countries would have a better
opportunity to become stable as well as more secure
against terrorist organizations.
The effects of debt on third world countries
are alarming and will likely continue to increase.
The deficit is affecting all aspects of society and
has impacted relations between the rich and poor
countries. Various campaign groups are working to
desperately amend government policy on debt by
analyzing the two types of debt, the possibility of
issuing grants rather than loans, and making society
more aware of the severity of this crisis, which are
crucial first steps in empowering the third world to
develop a better environment for its citizenry, and a
worse one for subversive organizations.
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The United States is susceptible to a potential attack by
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a terrorist
group known as FARC. Several guerilla tactics are viable
for implementation military and civilian personnel in
addition to clandestine operations. There is a 70 percent
probability that FARC will soon engage in retaliatory,
covert operations against key U.S. military installations
in U.S. cities bordering the Gulf of Mexico.
The history of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia can be traced to an early 1960s guerilla
group of rebel peasants that was established as its
transliterated acronym “FARC” in 1964. Through the
1980s, this terrorist group accumulated a large portion
of its revenue from kidnapping and extortion. Many of
the U.S. anti-drug policies of the 1990s inadvertently
aided FARC and enabled the organization to increase
its territory within Colombia.105 FARC has engaged in
multiple deadly firefights with the Colombian military
and the DEA since the 1990s. In fiscal year 1999, the
United States expanded its assistance to Colombia
to $317 million, and later to almost $1 billion in
2000.106 President Andres Pastrana attempted to
negotiate a peaceful resolution with FARC in 1999,
but was unsuccessful in the endeavor. During that
year, the rebel organization was able to capture a third
of the country’s territory. By 2002, the massive rebel
war machine and drug trafficking empire reached
its peak.107
The United States, as an ally of the Colombian
military, has caused significant setbacks to FARC’s
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strategic objectives since 2001; however, U.S.
involvement did not immediately deter the terrorist
group’s financing methods. In 2002 alone, the
guerillas were responsible for almost all of Colombia’s
2,882 kidnappings, which amassed millions of dollars
in ransom.108 The group also held three Americans
captive for four years, releasing them in 2006; this
demonstrates their willingness to kidnap American
personnel.109 For years, the United States has been
funding and training the AUC, or the United SelfDefense Groups of Colombia, to fight against FARC
forces. In addition, the U.S. has allocated massive
financial support to the Colombian government for
the sole purpose of destroying the terrorist faction.
Since the beginning, FARC’s leadership structure
has consisted of a seven-man council. In 2008, the
Colombian military launched a massive raid with the
support of U.S. intelligence against a FARC camp
located across the border in Ecuador. The raid resulted in
the deaths of key leaders Raul Reyes and Ivan Rios, with
the eventual elimination of top commander Manuel
Marulanda two years later. The dismantling of leadership,
in conjunction with captured intelligence, struck a
massive blow to FARC and its capabilities. Intelligence
recovered in the raid indicated that Ecuadorian president
Rafael Correa, along with Venezuela, had been rendering
financial support to FARC and providing a safe haven
in Ecuador.110 A Colombian bombing raid dispatched
FARC commander Mono Jojoy in September of 2010,
while a similar raid the following year resulted in the
death of FARC’s chief leader and commander, Alfonso
Cano. The President of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos,
called it the “most devastating blow to the group in
its decades-long insurgency.”111 Now that five of the
original seven council commanders have been killed,
FARC’s strength has decreased and its operational ability
has been limited.
108 Ibid, 2.
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Junior level leaders in FARC have been extradited
to the United States to face drug trafficking charges,
which gives FARC another reason to retaliate. An
organization that has endured 48 years, the longest of
any terrorist group, is certainly capable of recovering
from these strategic blows. In doing so, FARC will
remember its enemies: Colombia and the United
States. While FARC’s hope of a dominant takeover
in Colombia is most likely futile, it is predictable that
they will commence a retaliatory strike against U.S.
citizens or military targets.
In comprehending FARC’s threat to U.S. security,
the group’s military capability and recurring strategic
themes must be analyzed. FARC’s troop strength has
significantly dropped to an estimated 8,000 fighters,
a mere half their number in 2002.112 After having
much of its communications systems infiltrated and
the majority of its leadership eliminated, an external
view would suggest that FARC is crippled indefinitely.
Yet this may not be the case; FARC had the audacity
to execute four hostages in 2011. The guerrillas’
financial supply still continues to flow in millions of
dollars every year. In 2008, it was estimated that the
organization made almost $500 million annually.113
By 2012, FARC has likely lost close to $200 million
to each year’s revenues because of military defeats.
Colombia’s terrorist group has advanced its
weaponry throughout the years. Upgraded landmines,
assault rifles, RPGs, and tactical gear have made FARC
more lethal. The group seemingly used improvised
explosive mines against Colombian soldiers, which
demonstrates their advanced weapons training.114 A
disturbing government report on March 26, 2008
claimed that Colombian officials had “recovered 66
pounds of depleted uranium that had been acquired
by FARC.”115 One Colombian police report in 2008
112 McDermott, “Colombia’s FARC Rebels: End to Kidnap a New
Start?”, 1.
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stated that Venezuela had sent $300 million to the
group’s leadership, and that FARC was “seeking
uranium on the black market and had plans for
a radioactive ‘dirty bomb.’”116 This confirms the
findings of the 2008 raid, which displays FARC’s
serious pursuit of dirty bombs that could be used
against the United States for retribution.
A second aspect of FARC’s military capability
is its recent buildup of allied support. Key alliances
with nation states and terrorist cells in South
America have strengthened FARC both internally
and externally. The captured computer files found
in 2008 strongly indicate that FARC has extensive
negotiations, cooperation, and possible support
from the government of Ecuador as well as a strong
relationship with President Chavez of Venezuela,
which dates back to 1992. Chavez’s support includes
current political patronage, secret financial funding,
and possible military aid.117 A 2010 State Department
report affirmed that Chavez’s government has not
been proactive in arresting Venezuelan government
and military officials linked to FARC; meanwhile,
U.S. officials testified in October of 2011 that FARC
is still procuring shelter locations across the border in
Venezuela.118
Two additional components of this relationship
must be observed. The first is that Venezuela, for
all intents and purposes, is a sworn enemy of the
United States. Venezuelan refineries are irreplaceable
to U.S. oil, and Chavez may use this as a playing
card to support a FARC operation against America.
Secondly, Venezuela is known for to accommodate
Iranian intelligence agents and Hezbollah recruits.
The cooperation between South American countries
and anti-American Middle Eastern groups lends truth
to the adage “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
The government of Ecuador has provided a safe
haven for FARC for many years, but recently seems
to have begun withdrawing support. Cuba has also
maintained strong yet discreet relations with FARC in
addition to the ETA, a strong terrorist and liberation

group in the Spanish Basque region.119 If the Cuban
government decides to provide even a temporary
safe haven for FARC, the group could use Cuba as
a launching point for a retaliatory strike on select
American targets in the Gulf of Mexico. Lastly, the
Colombian terrorist group has become more lethal in
the past six years in the areas of advanced terrorism and
explosives; this is likely because the Irish Republican
Army (IRA) had dispatched personnel to Colombia
to provide advanced terrorist tactics training and
bomb-making expertise.
Throughout its history of violence and rebellion,
FARC has consistently utilized one effective method to
accumulate more military power. This method would
certainly be plausible if FARC decides to engage in
covert strikes on the Gulf Coast against Americans
and military targets. Stratfor labels it the “Carrot-andStick Strategy.”120 The Colombian government has
been insistent about establishing peace negotiations
with the revolutionary group for decades, though
FARC has traditionally used dialogue to build up its
military strength. An example of this is the ambush
in March 2012 that killed 11 Colombian soldiers
which was conducted on the same day that FARC
announced it was ready to release hostages.121 The
faction will routinely increase the tenacity of offensive
strikes on key investments in Colombia, such as
destroying the CamonLimon-Covenas pipeline in
2012, or kidnapping high-profile citizens until the
Colombian government returns to the negotiation
table.122
This tactic would certainly be implemented if
FARC engaged in kidnapping U.S. citizens along
the Gulf Coast, in addition to bombing targeted
infrastructure. FARC would sporadically increase
its amount of kidnappings while dangling the carrot
of hostage releases until the U.S. extends its hand of
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diplomacy. The organization would then demand
that the U.S. end financial and tactical support to
the Colombian military, in addition to requiring the
extraction of U.S. personnel from Bogota. Realistically
however, FARC would only end its operations if it
felt that it had drained a satisfying amount of leverage
of America’s political leverage and strength from
the region.
In studying FARC’s capabilities and attack
strategies, the following is a projection of most likely
scenarios. The U.S. Army Southern Command,
known as USSOUTHCOM, should be prepared
for the possibility of a retaliatory FARC operation
against U.S. military and civilian assets, both within
Colombian and United States boundaries. The first
projected strategy is a possible “nightmare” scenario.
One such potential series of developments is
this: FARC could conceal several small covert ops
teams in cargo ships leaving Havana bound for Gulf
cities like New Orleans, Miami, and Texas. Due to
known weaknesses in U.S. port security, FARC could
successfully gain illegal entrance. Upon gaining a
foothold, FARC could target drilling rigs, oil fields in
Texas and New Orleans, or oil platforms in the Gulf
of Mexico. Three small teams, with advanced training
by the IRA, could target at least three separate sites
and devastate the American economy in a matter of
days. A second permutation of a nightmare scenario
could involve the targeting of U.S. narcotics agents
in Colombia; FARC could use the same strategy and
methods to deliver a blow to USSOUTHCOM in
Miami, the Joint Interagency Task Force-South in
Key West, or US Army South at Fort Sam Houston
in Texas, although this would be a significantly more
difficult operation.
In either scenario, direct covert operations
against the United States would certainly provoke
retaliation upon FARC, or would at least commence
a withdrawal from Colombia through diplomacy. The
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the longest
running terrorist organization, will not soon forget
America’s intervention in their affairs in Colombia.
Therefore, we must now anticipate FARC’s longawaited revenge in the form of direct attack upon
the United States. With this potential threat on the
horizon, America must remain vigilant as it stands
against the threat of terrorist organizations.
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